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International financial institutions are showing a renewed interest in
measures to enhance national budget management and strengthen the
integrity of public finance in emerging economies. The role of national
parliaments and supreme audit institutions in the governance of the
budget and the accountability of public finances is being rediscovered.
To strengthen the contribution these institutions make to the budget
process, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is providing them
with multilateral loans whose potential remains unexplored and whose
effectiveness could be improved. Besides increasing technical capacity
and enhancing operational efficiency, second-stage reforms should
enhance the governance of public finance and fiscal control by ensuring
greater financial autonomy and political independence for supreme audit
institutions and promoting more efficacious links between supreme audit
institutions and parliamentary public accounts committees.
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It is increasingly recognized that the quality of the
budget process is a critical determinant of good
government. Budget transparency and fiscal oversight
are critical for enhancing public finance management,
ensuring government accountability and curbing
corruption. Consequently, the governance of the budget
and the institutions of accountability, transparency and
integrity in public finance are the subject of renewed
scrutiny.
In the course of the 1990s, there was a general
move towards a second wave of reform strategies to
enhance public budgeting and public finance
management in emerging economies. Traditional
approaches have tended to focus on improving
efficiency and effectiveness within the executive
branch, in particular finance ministries, executing
agencies, tax authorities and central banks. In recent
years, however, greater attention has been directed at
strengthening the institutions of economic governance
beyond the executive branch and improving the
mechanisms of oversight and accountability. This
second stage of reform is partly the result of new
findings on the determinants of the quality of
economic policy and the need to balance executive
discretion in public budgeting with mechanisms
ensuring government accountability. This has led to
a renewed interest in the credibility of public finance
systems and the contribution of national parliaments
and supreme audit institutions1 to budget
accountability.2
The introduction of governance concerns in the
development agenda has led international financial
institutions (IFIs) to broaden the scope of their efforts
to promote economic reform and governmental
financial management. These IFIs provide significant
support to strengthen the institutions of public finance
governance in emerging economies in the broader
context of the second-generation institutional reforms
being sought (Santiso, 2004c and 2003a; Burki, Perry
and others, 1998). A salient feature of new approaches
to public-sector reform is the narrowing of the gap
between the economic and political aspects of
governance, a trend that is particularly noticeable in the
IDB approach.
The IFIs have a fiduciary and a developmental
interest in improving accountability in public finance
management. Mitigating fiduciary risk in policy-based
lending and direct budget support necessarily requires
strong, credible and reliable budget management
systems in recipient countries (Santiso, n/d).
The World Bank adopted a strategy to guide its
involvement in governance issues in November 2000
(World Bank, 1997 and 2000) and the idb updated its
strategy for the modernization of the State in July 2003
(IDB, 2003). These strategies underscore the contribution
of parliaments and supreme audit institutions to
government accountability in public finance
management. Furthermore, prompted by recent findings
on aid effectiveness, State capture and corruption, the
IFIs have upgraded their diagnosis instruments for
evaluating the quality of public budgeting and the
robustness of the mechanisms of accountability in
government finances.3 For example, the Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA)
programme, a multi-donor initiative established in
December 2001, aims at harmonizing international
public-sector standards in accounting, auditing and
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particular public budgeting and external auditing. This essay was
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Anticorruption Office of the Ministry of Justice, Security and Human
Rights of Argentina in July-August 2003. Opinions expressed herein
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those of the aforementioned institutions. The author is grateful to
Linn Hammergren, Javier Santiso, Lynette Asselin, María Isabel
dos Santos, Joachim Wehner, Warren Krafchik, John Williamson,
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1 Supreme audit institutions are also referred to as general accounting
offices or national audit offices. The term “supreme audit institution”
will be used hereafter to refer to those institutions tasked with the
external audit of government programmes and public accounts.
2 See Santiso (n/d, 2004a and 2004b), Haggard and McCubbins
(2001), Schedler, Diamond and Plattner (1999) and Mainwaring and
Welna (2003).
3 See DFID (2001 and 2002), Brobäck and Sjölander (2002) and PEFA
(2003).
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internal control in developing and transitional
countries.4 The bilateral aid agencies assembled in the
Utstein group (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and
the United Kingdom) have been particularly active in
supporting government accountability institutions in
developing countries.5
Similarly, in the context of European Union (EU)
enlargement, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) has
been particularly active since 1993 in building the
institutional capacity of supreme audit institutions in
candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe,
as part of the process of convergence towards EU
standards of public finance management and auditing.6
The Support for Improvement in Governance and
Management in Central and Eastern European
Countries (SIGMA) programme, established in 1992 as
a joint initiative of the then European Community (EC)
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), has contributed to the
modernization of supreme audit institutions and the
strengthening of external control mechanisms in the
public sector of candidate countries. Accession has
provided a unique incentive to strengthen public
finance accountability systems in those countries set
to join the EU. For instance, the process established
to monitor implementation of the 1997 Copenhagen
criteria has allowed reforms to gradually expand and
consolidate, leading to the accession of a first wave of
10 countries in May 2004.
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean,
the institutional strengthening of finance ministries and
tax agencies has been supported by the multilateral
development banks and the United States Government,
acting through its General Accounting Office (USGAO)
and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Already in the 1920s and 1930s,
the United States provided technical assistance to Latin
American countries for establishing their central banks
and upgrading their systems of government finance
(Drake, 1989). The Kemmerer missions to the Andean
countries helped set up strong comptroller- and auditor-
general’s offices to provide for central accounting and
auditing of government finances. Similarly, since the
early 1990s the World Bank, IDB and USAID have helped
Latin American countries to modernize their financial
administration through the establishment of integrated
financial management systems (Dorotinsky and
Matsuda, 2002). In the course of that decade,
Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Venezuela benefited from technical
assistance loans and grants to enhance their
governmental financial management systems.
This essay reviews IDB lending to the institutions
of budget oversight and public finance accountability
in Latin America and the Caribbean, essentially
national parliaments and supreme audit institutions.
The support given by the IDB to legislative budget
institutions and external audit agencies is part of its
broader effort to enhance financial management in the
public sector of borrowing countries. Nevertheless, this
essay argues that the second stage of economic reform
requires new approaches to strengthen the institutions
of public finance governance (Krueger, 2000). It
involves addressing the political economy determinants
of governance reform and fiscal control. In particular,
ensuring greater oversight and integrity in public
finance necessarily requires enhancing the functional
linkages between the different institutions participating
in the budget process and the national system of
control.
The essay is divided into four sections. Section
II that follows briefly reviews the new approach being
taken by the IFIs to public finance management, which
underscores concerns over transparency and
accountability. Section III focuses on the patterns of
IDB concessional lending to supreme audit institutions
and parliaments in Latin America and the Caribbean.
It is argued that there exists unexplored potential to
enhance the effectiveness of supreme audit institutions
and national parliaments in public budgeting, which
would entail addressing the political economy of
institutional reform and fiscal control. Besides
increasing technical capacity and enhancing operational
efficiency, second-stage reforms need to strengthen the
political independence and financial autonomy of
supreme audit institutions and promote more
efficacious links between these institutions and
parliamentary public accounts committees. Section IV,
lastly, offers some observations on the political aspects
of public finance accountability.
4 See www.pefa.org
5 See, in particular, the Utstein Anti-Corruption Centre, www.u4.no.
For more information on donor-funded projects, see also
www.respondanet.com.
6 Paradoxically, the ECA has not been able to certify the accounts of
the EU in the past eight years, reflecting the difficulty of redressing
structural dysfunctions in financial management systems.
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The agencies of public finance accountability constitute
a critical component of the new paradigm of
development economics. They are key determinants of
the institutional capabilities required to undertake
second-generation economic reforms beyond the
Washington consensus (Krueger, 2000; Kuczynski and
Williamson, 2003; Santiso, 2004c and 2003a). In the
first stage of reform, the policy prescriptions of the
Washington consensus favoured a predominant role for
the executive in public budgeting and the insulation of
economic policy-making. However, abuses by strong
presidents misusing the prerogatives of executive decree
authority and the delegation of legislative authority have
often led to the neutralization of accountability
mechanisms, the capture of supreme audit institutions
and restrictions on the role of parliaments in the budget
process (Santiso, 2001a and 2001b). Accordingly, the
second-generation reforms now being encouraged seek
to restore the mechanisms of transparency, oversight
and accountability in the governance of the budget.
1. Governance and public finance
The quality of a country’s governance system is a key
determinant of the ability to pursue sustainable
economic and social development. The push by IFIs
to confront governance challenges in developing
countries has largely originated in the urgent need to
tackle the structural causes of embedded corruption.
This scourge became a core concern of the World Bank
in 1996 when its new president, James Wolfensohn,
committed the organization to fighting the “cancer of
corruption”. It is now well established that corruption
has corrosive effects on both economic management
and aid effectiveness. Thenceforth, the World Bank
began supporting programmes to strengthen
accountability institutions, such as the rule of law,
judicial systems, public finance management systems,
and parliamentary oversight mechanisms (World Bank,
2000). In 1997, it adopted an anti-corruption strategy
aimed at mainstreaming anti-corruption in its lending
policies and practices.
According to the standard World Bank definition,
the concept of governance captures “the manner in
which power is exercised in the management of a
country’s economic and social resources for
development” (World Bank, 1992, p.1). It encompasses
the form of the political regime, the process by which
authority is exercised in the management of a country’s
economic and social resources for development, and
the capacity of governments to design, formulate and
implement policies and discharge functions. Yet, the
“importance of government credibility and
commitment to policy reform has been essentially
neglected as a pivotal condition for effective economic
reform” (Ahrens, 2001, p. 75). Credibility in economic
policy largely depends on the effectiveness of the
mechanisms of accountability (Haggard and
McCubbins, 2001; Santiso, 2004a).
2. Approaches to governance reform
Governance is a difficult concept for the multilateral
development banks, which do not want to be seen as
political and thus adopt a doctrine of political neutrality
(Santiso, 2001c and 2004d). One of the most contentious
issues relates to the distinction between economic and
political aspects of governance. While the World Bank
recognizes that governance is intrinsically a political
concept, it is careful to stress that its engagement
through lending, technical assistance and policy advice
is confined to its economic dimensions, and notes that
the nature of the political system falls outside the
purview of its mandate as enshrined in its Articles of
Agreement. Similarly, the Asian Development Bank
(AsDB), which was the first regional bank to adopt a
governance policy in 1995, defines good governance
as “sound development management” based on four
interrelated “pillars”: accountability, transparency,
predictability and participation. For AsDB, “good
governance is good government” (AsDB, 1995 and
1999). The African Development Bank (AFDB) follows
a similar approach (AfDB, 2000).
The IDB approach to State reform and public-
sector modernization shares several features with that
of the World Bank, in particular its technical bias
(Santiso, 2000). In theory, and like the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 1992), the
IDB adopts a more explicitly political approach to
governance reform. It is generally less reluctant to
engage in politically sensitive areas and confront the
political economy of institutional development. It had
II
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broader political goals enshrined in the expansion of
its mandate in 1994, so that this now includes the
consolidation of democracy as one of its corporate
objectives. The IDB policy on the modernization of the
State was first articulated in 1996. It was updated in
2003 to integrate concerns over the political economy
of reform, in particular party systems, electoral rules
and executive-legislative relations (IDB, 2003). The
Bank authorities recognize that politics matters for
development and that, consequently, lending and
technical assistance should more actively address
political economy considerations (Payne, Zovatto and
others, 2002).
Undeniably, the introduction of the governance
agenda has led the IFIs to broaden the scope of their
interventions, entering largely uncharted territories
such as judicial reform, parliamentary strengthening
and anti-corruption. Between 1996 and 2000, the
World Bank began over 600 governance-related
programmes and initiatives in 95 countries, and
between 1987 and 1998, it carried out 169 civil service
reform programmes in 80 countries. In Latin America,
according to recent estimates, it undertook 126 core
public-sector reform projects between 1982 and 2002,
totalling US$ 12 billion (Fuhr and Krause, 2003). A
majority of these projects, usually policy-based loans
with a marked emphasis on fiscal reform, have a strong
focus on public budgeting and government financial
management. Similarly, legal and judicial reform has
become a core component of the World Bank
governance portfolio (Santiso, 2004d). Since 1991, the
World Bank has financed 480 projects in 84 countries
that deal with or include components of legal and
judicial reform, totalling US$ 380 million. Between
1991 and 2001, the Bank approved 35 projects
exclusively devoted to judicial reform.7 It has also
established targeted lending instruments and upgraded
its own capacities to assess judicial performance and
promote judicial reform by undertaking judicial sector
assessments (JSAs) since 1994 and more comprehensive
institutional and governance reviews (IGRs) since 1999.
Similarly, between 1993 and 2001, the IDB
approved 18 loans and 65 technical co-operation
operations to reform judicial systems and modernize
the administration of justice in 21 of its 26 member
countries, amounting to US$ 461 million in investment
(Biebesheimer and Payne, 2001; Santiso, 2003b).
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was also
urged in 1996 by its Board of Governors to “promote
good governance in all its aspects, including by
ensuring the rule of law, improving efficiency and
accountability in the public sector, and tackling
corruption, as essential elements of a framework within
which economies can prosper”. Since then, the Fund’s
role in governance has expanded considerably,
integrating concerns over transparency, accountability
and predictability of fiscal policy (IMF, 1997 and 2001).
The Fund has spread the neutral mantle of technical
expertise over its approach to governance reform,
focusing on those economic aspects of governance that
could have a significant macroeconomic impact and
those that affect the implementation of economic
reforms. In 1997, it adopted guidelines specifying that
its “involvement in good governance should be limited
to economic aspects of governance” (IMF, 1997, p. 3),
namely, the transparency of government accounts, the
effectiveness of public resource management, and the
stability of the regulatory environment for private-
sector activity. Nevertheless, the Fund’s position
regarding the political context of borrowing countries
remains ambiguous, as its involvement in Indonesia
and Argentina reflects.
The Fund’s involvement in the reform of domestic
governance stems in part from its new role in capital-
account management and its promotion of structural
adjustment since the 1980s. These new roles
necessarily entail a more continuous involvement in the
reform of borrowing countries’ policies beyond
temporary crisis management. The main channels
through which the Fund promotes good governance are
surveillance, lending and technical assistance. In terms
of surveillance, the Fund has actively sought to
promote standards and codes of good practice through
consultations under Article IV of its Articles of
Agreement, particularly with regard to fiscal matters.
Since the late 1990s, the Fund has acknowledged
the importance of transparency in monetary and
financial policy management, adopting a Code of Good
Practices on Fiscal Transparency in 2001.8 A country’s
observance of these standards is assessed in the Reports
7 The Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency has provided legal advice to
over 87 countries in over 45 specialized areas since 1986, and
training in legal and judicial reform has also become a core activity
of the World Bank Institute (WBI).
8 The Fund has identified 12 key areas, which include accounting,
auditing, anti-corruption, banking supervision, corporate governance,
fiscal transparency, monetary policy and financial policy
transparency.
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on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs);
264 of these had been completed for 80 countries by
the end of June 2002, of which 193 have been
published. These diagnosis instruments complement
those used by the World Bank to assess the quality of
public finance processes, such as Public Expenditure
Reviews (PERs) and Country Financial Accountability
Assessments (CFAAs). Although they possess different
mandates and perform different functions, the IFIs are
seeking to better coordinate and harmonize their
assessment instruments over the public finance cycle,
from revenue collection to expenditure management
(PEFA, 2003).
3. Budget oversight
The role of parliaments and external auditing agencies
in public budgeting, public finance accountability and
corruption control figures prominently in the new
strategy on the modernization of the State adopted by
the IDB in July 2003.9 After a first wave of reforms
targeting the efficiency and effectiveness of
government financial management systems within the
executive, the new strategy acknowledges the critical
importance of the mechanisms of transparency and
external oversight in the budget process. The role of
national parliaments in public budgeting is being
rediscovered throughout the region.
In its efforts to consolidate democratic
governance, the IDB (2003) stresses the need to
“strengthen the institutional capacity of the legislative
branch”, in particular by supporting programmes
designed to “strengthen technical assistance systems
that will improve the quality of legislation and help
ensure budgetary, monitoring and oversight functions
are performed based on objective and technical
criteria” (p. 12). Furthermore, the strategy allows the
IDB to provide support for increasing “the technical
capacities and functional independence of institutions
that oversee government performance, for example, the
offices of the comptroller general, court of accounts,
auditor general, ombudsman, public defender, public
prosecutor and attorney general” (p. 13).
Accordingly, parliaments and supreme audit
institutions are to be approached as key components
in national systems of control. The IDB recognizes that
“audit and other supervisory institutions do not always
have the independence, objectivity and technical
capacities necessary for them to be able to oversee
adherence to the rule of law” (IDB, 2003, p. 5). It notes
that “the prevalence of corruption is to some degree
an expression of the weakness of the rule of law, but
calls attention also to the weakness of the State’s
financial administration” (p. 5). The IDB approach
emphasizes the need to “strengthen the fiscal capacity
of the State and improve the efficiency and
transparency of expenditure management” and the
necessity of implementing “comprehensive financial
and accounting management systems and promoting
the transparency of budgetary information” (p. 18).
9 The strategy focuses on four priority areas of intervention: the
democratic system; the rule of law and justice reform; State, markets
and society; and public management.
III
Lending to budget oversight institutions
In recent years, the IFIs have “rediscovered” public
budgeting, in particular the role of parliaments and
external audit agencies in the governance of the budget.
Consequently, the contribution of legislative budget
institutions to budget policy-making and oversight is
being re-evaluated. It is being increasingly recognized
that these institutions are critical to enforcing
government accountability and guaranteeing integrity
in public finance management. In particular the
importance of parliamentary budget and public
accounts committees is being re-emphasized, especially
in presidential systems. The OECD Best Practices for
Budget Transparency (OECD, 2001a) include
considerations concerning the role of parliaments in the
budget process, and thus go a step further than the IMF
Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, which
tends to restrict itself to the governance of the budget
within the executive. This restraint is also noticeable
in the assistance provided by the IFIs to transitional
countries reforming their budget procedures.
Furthermore, technical assistance has tended to
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concentrate either on the expenditure side, providing
assistance to prime minister’s offices and finance
ministries, or the revenue side, providing tax reform
advice and strengthening the capacities of tax
authorities.
Nevertheless, in recent years multilateral
development banks have started to broaden their
support for budget policy-making and oversight
institutions, by lending support to supreme audit
institutions and national parliaments. While their
approach remains restrained by a technical bias which
tends to inhibit them from addressing politically
sensitive governance issues such as the deficient links
between supreme audit institutions and parliamentary
public accounts committees, this is starting to change.
Indeed, the effectiveness of fiscal control mechanisms
and legislative budget oversight in Latin America is
hampered by the dysfunctional relations between the
individual components of the systems of control and
integrity in public finances. In general, these different
components tend to act in isolation from one another.
This has allowed corruption to flourish almost
unrestricted in countries such as Argentina under Carlos
Menem (1989-1999) and Peru under Alberto Fujimori
(1990-2000), where the institutions of integrity and
accountability were particularly vulnerable to capture.
Ultimately, as this essay argues, the effectiveness
of national integrity systems largely depends on the
strength of the synergies between their different
components, including government accounting
systems, internal auditing mechanisms, external control
institutions, administrative and criminal courts, and
parliamentary oversight committees (Diamond, 2002).
The support provided by the IDB to national parliaments
and supreme audit institutions will now be briefly
reviewed.
1. Lending to national parliaments
Parliamentary strengthening is a relatively new area for
multilateral development banks. There is indeed
heightened awareness of the role of parliaments in the
budget process and their responsibility in ensuring
government accountability.10 Legislatures play a
pivotal role in the budget process, contributing to
democratic accountability and providing the necessary
“checks and balances” to executive discretion in
presidential systems. Indeed, the general trend is for
legislatures to take a more active role in the budget
process. However, they have to demonstrate that they
are able to do so responsibly and ensure fiscal discipline.
The challenge facing Latin American legislatures is to
strengthen the institutional arrangements fostering
fiscally responsible interventions.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, as table 1
shows, the IDB approved seven lending operations
between 1994 and 2003 totalling US$ 45 million, as
part of parliamentary reform programmes totalling over
US$ 60 million. The stated aim of IDB financing is to
strengthen the representative, legislative and oversight
functions of parliaments. The bulk of financing is
directed at “hardware investments” such as physical
infrastructure development, information technology
improvements, and human resources management.
A salient feature of IDB lending to this sector is
its focus on enhancing the role of parliament in the
budget process, primarily by improving committee
work, strategic planning and capacities for legislative
research. Legislatures are central both to the making
of budget policy (through the budget committees
approving the State budget) and to the oversight of
budget execution (through the public accounts
committee). A first set of initiatives supported by the
IDB aims at strengthening legislatures’ internal
structures and the procedures shaping the legislative
process. There is a marked emphasis on those
parliamentary committees involved in the budget
process, at either the approval or the oversight stage
(e.g., the budget and public accounts committees).
Public accounts committees, now regarded as a core
legislative budgetary institution, are a critical linkage
between the responsibility of parliament in enforcing
government accountability in public finance and the
external auditing function performed by supreme audit
institutions (Wehner, 2002). A second set of IDB
initiatives aims at enhancing the capacities of
parliaments for independent budget analysis,
contributing to the creation or strengthening of
legislative research centres and budget offices advising
budget and public accounts committees. IDB lending
operations have been relatively successful in helping
parliaments to enhance their research and advisory
services. In Venezuela they have contributed to the
creation of legislative budget offices, although this
remains an isolated case.
The strengthening of legislative budgetary powers
also reflects a gradual shifting of power between the
executive and the legislative branches in Latin
10 See Krafchik and Wehner (1998), OECD (2001b), Manning and
Stepenhurst (2002) and Wehner (2003).
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TABLE 1
Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank lending
to national parliaments
Year Country Title  Amount (millions of dollars) Disbursement
Total IDB Counterpart period
lending financing (years)
2003 Peru Institutional Strengthening Programme for the
Peruvian Congress 10 7 3 4.5
2000 Honduras Modernization of the Honduran Congress 3.25 2.60 0.65 4
2000 Dominican Programme for Modernizing the National Congress and 28 22.30 5.70 3
Republic the Office of the Comptroller-General (25.55)a
1999 Colombia Modernization of the Congress of Colombia 10 6 4 …
1999 El Salvador Modernization and Strengthening of the 4.40 3.50 0.90 4
Legislative Assembly
1996 Panama Project to Modernize the Legislature 4.10 2.80 1.30 4
1994 Peru Institutional Development for the Legislative 3.74 2.70 1.04 …
Branch of Government
Total 61.04
Source: Based on projects approved as of October 2003, www.iadb.org.
a Amount allocated to the parliament.
American presidential systems. Legislatures are
becoming increasingly assertive as opposition parties
make strides. Historically, legislatures have been
dominated by majorities belonging to or associated
with the president’s party. This is starting to change
and many presidents no longer control legislative
majorities. These new dynamics of executive-
legislative relations are having a significant impact on
economic policy-making and public budgeting.
Legislatures are gradually re-asserting their powers of
budget oversight, partly as a result of the new-found
assertiveness of parliamentary oppositions. Divided
government —the situation in which the president no
longer controls the legislature— is becoming
increasingly common throughout the region and
creating new constraints on executive discretion in
public budgeting. The surge of legislative activism in
public budgeting in Mexico is partly the result of the
emergence of an assertive opposition since the long-
time ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party,
lost its majority in parliament in 1997 (Carbonell,
2002; Weldon, 2002). In Brazil, parliament has
traditionally been the privileged arena for pork-
barrelling over budget appropriations and amendments
(Samuels, 2002). Even in Argentina, a country
characterized by relatively disciplined parties, public
budgeting has been the subject of more conflict and
bargaining than formerly (Eaton, 2002; Jones, 2001).
The case of Mexico is illustrative. Since 1997,
Mexico has undertaken a series of institutional reforms
specifically aimed at strengthening the role of
parliament in budget policy-making and oversight. The
technical capacities for independent budget scrutiny
were significantly enhanced with the establishment in
1998 of the well staffed and funded Centre for the
Study of Public Finances (Centro de Estudios en
Finanzas Públicas, CEFP) in the lower chamber of
parliament. The Mexican parliament’s general research
capacities were already fairly substantial by that time,
with the Research and Analysis Service (Servicio de
Investigación y Análisis, SIA) of the parliamentary
library and the Institute for Legislative Research of the
upper chamber of parliament (Instituto de
Investigaciones Legislativas del Senado de la
República, IILSEN), created in 1985 to provide general
technical advice to the Senate. Thus, parliament is now
better equipped than before to discharge its budgetary
responsibilities. It is indeed noticeable that a main
impediment to legislative budgeting often resides in the
incapacity of a parliament to engage with the budget
process, rather than the restraints put on its budgetary
powers. Technical capacities are thus important
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considerations when assessing the effective role of
legislatures in budget oversight. In 1999, after four
years of negotiations, an external audit office was
established specifically to assist parliament in the
oversight of federal public finances and the certification
of public accounts. The Supreme Federal Auditing
Office (Auditoría Superior de la Federación, ASF) was
created as an advisory body to the lower chamber of
parliament, assisting the latter in the review of budget
execution and certification of the federal government
public accounts. In 2000, parliament also passed a law
on external oversight and accountability (Ley Superior
de Fiscalización de la Federación). The emergence of
an effective parliamentary opposition as a result of the
1997 elections, which ultimately succeeded in
defeating the long-time ruling party in the general
elections of 2000, thus significantly increased both the
incentives and the capacities for effective legislative
budget oversight.
The contribution of parliamentary budget offices
to effective budget oversight is increasingly recognized,
as it allows parliaments to access independent sources
of budget analysis, rather than relying on the
information provided by the government. Access to
budgetary information is indeed strategic in the sense
that it is the parliamentary opposition that has the
greatest incentives to strengthen parliament’s capacities
for independent budget analysis, thereby allowing it to
effectively oversee government performance (Messick,
2002; Rubio Llorente, 1993). Capable professional
staff and institutionalized technical expertise within
parliament itself are necessary conditions for
legislatures to be able to exercise their budget oversight
functions effectively and responsibly. The lack of
professional legislative staff and the absence or
weaknesses of advisory services to parliamentary
committees are major hindrances to effective legislative
budgeting. Members of parliaments, including those
sitting on the budget and public accounts committees,
do have their own political advisors. However, standing
parliamentary committees lack the necessary research
and advisory capacity and permanent advisors with the
required technical expertise and institutional memory.
This, too, is starting to change. Although not as
powerful as the United States Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), incipient legislative budget offices are
tending to gradually emerge throughout Latin America,
reflecting an increasing recognition of the current
weakness and, simultaneously, the potential
contribution of parliaments to budget oversight. Chile,
Mexico and Venezuela possess incipient legislative
budget offices, while Argentina and Colombia are
currently considering establishing such offices.
Understandably, the IDB is reluctant to engage in
reform of the incentive structure shaping the role of
parliaments in the budget process, in particular the
quality of the legislative process, the role of political
parties and parliamentary groups, executive-legislative
relations and electoral rules. These are indeed very
complex and sensitive areas, which do not lend
themselves to quick fixes and transposed institutional
solutions. They require a solid understanding of the
interests and incentives shaping the behaviour of
individuals in institutional contexts. The IDB, which is
owned by borrowing governments and staffed by high-
quality policy makers from the region, is well placed
to understand these dynamics. Yet, lending operations
tend to confine themselves to the inner working of
parliaments, rather than approach public budgeting as
an integral process. As a result, loan operations often
fail to generate the systemic impact they potentially
could have on the quality of the budget process and
parliament’s role in budget oversight.
More fundamentally, it is increasingly recognized
that the nature of the political regime and the quality
of the political party system are key variables. In
particular, “opposition parties have the greatest
incentive to oversee government” (Messick, 2002, p. 2)
and ensure effective oversight of government financial
management. Indeed, in many parliamentary systems,
such as the United Kingdom, a representative of the
main opposition party chairs public accounts
committees. Ultimately, the degree of cohesion and
discipline of political parties determines, to a great
extent, the effectiveness of the institutions of
accountability and the quality of executive-legislative
relations. Understandably, these are extremely difficult
questions and highly contentious areas of engagement
for the IFIs.
A critical challenge for strengthening legislative
budget oversight is that only the parliamentary
opposition, when it exists, has an interest in enhancing
parliament’s capacities for effective budget oversight,
and thus an incentive to create or strengthen legislative
capacities for independent review. As a result, the
strengthening of legislative budget institutions must
necessarily be approached in the broader context of
executive-legislative relations in presidential systems
of government.
In Venezuela, for example, an Economic and
Financial Advisory Office (Oficina de Asesoría
Económico y Financiera de la Asamblea Nacional,
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OAEF) was created in 1997 within the National
Assembly, with IDB support. Its objective was to
enhance the technical advisory services of parliament
in public finance. This new parliamentary structure was
able to draw on existing sources of legislative research
and analysis, such as the Autonomous Legislative
Information Service (Servicio Autónomo de Información
Legislativa, SAIL) created in 1994. Nevertheless,
increasing tensions between the executive and the
legislature since President Hugo Chávez took office
have undermined the functioning of the OAEF, which
was closed in February 2000 to be subsequently
reopened in June of the same year, as part of the
reactivation of the loan suspended by the IDB. In 2002-
2003 it came under renewed pressure (Rojas and
Zavarce, 2004). The case of Venezuela is particularly
interesting because the IDB became, willingly or not,
an actor in the struggle between the executive and the
legislature over budgetary powers.
2. Lending to supreme audit institutions
Lending to supreme audit institutions is also a
relatively new area for multilateral development banks
(Llanos, 2002). In theory, supreme audit institutions act
as a core oversight mechanism to ensure that
government is held to account for the manner in which
it manages public finances. They are independent State
institutions responsible for auditing government
performance and public accounts and, in some cases,
supervising the internal auditing system.11 While
significant progress has been made over recent years
in improving legal and financial compliance in
government spending, much remains to be done to
anchor performance auditing, as well as the effective
external auditing of budget execution. In many Latin
American countries, external auditing of budget
execution and certification of public accounts remains
deficient, and external audit reports fail to inform the
budget-making process in a timely manner.
The multilateral development banks have only
recently begun to support auditors-general and
strengthen supreme audit institutions, and their role is
still modest. IDB support for supreme audit institutions
has generated great expectations in many countries, as
it is taking place at a critical stage of the reform process
and the modernization of the State. As countries realize
that sound public financial management and effective
anti-corruption mechanisms require robust accountability
institutions, especially in Latin America’s presidential
systems, IDB support for supreme audit institutions
necessarily occurs in the broader context of the work
needed to strengthen governmental financial
administration. This being so, IDB lending constitutes
a potent signalling mechanism that may help
strength the hand of reformers. For example, in
Chile, the US$ 25 million loan programme agreed
with the IDB in 2001 has allowed the Chilean supreme
audit institution to pursue its institutional strengthening
programme, which probably would not have been
possible otherwise.
Since 1993, the IDB has approved nine institutional
strengthening projects for supreme audit institutions in
Latin America, involving lending of over US$ 50
million in the context of institutional strengthening
worth over US$ 90 million, while two new operations
worth over US$ 12 million are in the pipeline. When
the latter are approved, the loan portfolio will total
some US$ 65 million (table 2). While these are
regarded as “pilot” loans by the IDB, since they are still
considered “innovative”, the pace has been quickening
since 2000.
Nevertheless, the relative size (in financial terms)
of these operations varies across countries, in both
absolute and relative terms. Therefore, expectations
about their impact ought to be realistic. Table 3 shows
the contribution of IDB loans to the budget of supreme
audit institutions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Nicaragua.
Several issues are worth underlining. First,
bilateral lending represents only a portion of the
institution’s budget, which can nevertheless be
substantial in some cases. While in Nicaragua IDB
lending contributes almost 30% of the annual budget
of the supreme audit institution, in Brazil the figure is
barely 1%. In Chile and Colombia, IDB lending
represents approximately 18% and 11% of the
institution’s annual budget, respectively. As might be
expected, this figure tends to be higher for smaller
countries, since the IDB regards these projects as
“innovative loans”. Second, budget allocations to
supreme audit institutions have tended to increase in
recent years, although their share of the national budget
remains small. In the case of Brazil, the budget of the
Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da
11 In some countries supreme audit institutions also act as the
supervisory agency for internal government auditing. Although this
essay focuses on external auditing, it is to be noted that the links
(or lack thereof) between internal and external auditing functions
are critical (Diamond, 2002).
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TABLE 2
Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank
lending to supreme audit institutions
Year Country Title Amount (millions of dollars) Disbursement
Total IDB Counterpart period
lending financing (years)
2004 Perua Modernization of the Office of the Comptroller-General 14.50 10.15 4.35 4
and deconcentration of the national oversight system
2002 Brazil Modernization of the Federal Court of Accounts 10 5 5 3
2002 Chile Modernization of the Office of the Comptroller-General 25 15 10 4.50
of the Republic
2002 Nicaragua Modernization Programme of the General Auditing Office 6 5.40 0.60 4
2000 Colombia Strengthening of the Offices of the Comptroller-General (CGR) 42 23 19 4
and Auditor-General of the Republic
2000 Hondurasd Strengthening and Modernization of the Office 3 2.5 0.50 …
of Administrative Integrity
2000 Dominican Programme for Modernizing the National Congress 2.45 2.45c … 3
Republic and the Office of the Comptroller-General (28)b
1999 El Salvador Modernization and Strengthening of the Accounts Tribunal 4 … … …
1994 Uruguay Modernization of the Accounts Tribunal 1.50 1.41 0.09 …
1993 Caribbean Audit Institutions of the Caribbean Countries 0.81 0.60 0.21 …
Total 109.26 64.91
Source: Projects approved or in preparation as of May 2004, www.iadb.org.
a Lending operation at the approval stage.
b Total for the project to modernize parliament and the supreme audit institution.
c Amount allocated to the supreme audit institution. The total is ascribed to the IDB loan because the amount of the local counterpart financing
cannot be determined.
d Lending operation at the design phase.
TABLE 3
Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank lending
(Millions of dollarsa and percentages)
Country Supreme audit institution’s Annual IDB lending
annual budget, In millions of dollars As percentage of supreme audit
millions of dollars  institution’s annual budget
Brazil (2003) 242.2 1.6 0.7
Chile (2002) 19.0 3.3 17.4
Colombia (2003) 54.3 5.8 10.6
Nicaragua (2002) 5.2 1.5 28.8
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the reports of supreme audit institutions.
a The fluctuation of the dollar in recent years means that caution is warranted when using it as a referent.
União, tcu) represents a mere 0.08% of the federal
budget (TCU, 2002, p. 38). Third, counterpart financing
is often significant, as in Brazil (50%), Chile (40%) and
Colombia (45%). These latter two aspects reflect the
increasing importance national governments attach to
the strengthening of external audit functions. Hence,
any assessment of the impact of these innovative
projects ought to consider not only their financial
size, but also their technical content and institutional
focus.
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In broad terms, IDB loans tend to focus on
improving the administrative efficiency of supreme
audit institutions through strategic and organizational
development, human resources management, capability
building and training, and improvements in information
technology, equipment and infrastructure. They also
include provisions for improving relations with civil
society. Furthermore, IDB projects have a marked focus
on improving legal and financial compliance auditing
functions, the core business of supreme audit
institutions. They sometimes include provisions for
“innovative initiatives”, in particular performance
auditing, environmental auditing or auditing techniques
for regulating agencies of public utilities, such as in
Brazil. Furthermore, they usually concentrate their
efforts on improving operational auditing of government
programmes, especially in the social sectors, rather than
enhancing the role of supreme audit institutions in the
auditing of the national budget and the certification of
public accounts by the legislature. Arguably, this latter
core function of supreme audit institutions would be
naturally enhanced as a result or “side-effect” of the
strengthening of the supreme audit institution as a
whole, albeit not automatically.
IDB lending operations only marginally address the
functional links between supreme audit institutions and
public accounts committees. As table 4 underscores, a
series of institutional factors determine the ultimate
effectiveness of supreme audit institutions, such as
vested powers, supervising authority, nomination and
removal procedures, scope of mandate and terms of
office. These are areas in which the IDB is reluctant to
engage openly. Supreme audit institutions in Latin
America are indeed characterized by their great
diversity. In Argentina, for example, the Office of the
Auditor-General (Auditoría General de la Nación, AGN)
is a collegial body that acts as the technical advisory
agency to parliament to ensure government
accountability and budget oversight; its president is
nominated by the main opposition group in parliament.
In other countries, such as Chile, Peru and Brazil,
supreme audit institutions are nominally independent of
both the executive and the legislature. In Brazil, the TCU
is a collegial body with a long institutional history that
also operates as an administrative court. It concentrates
its audit work on compliance auditing of government
programmes and agencies. Its main “client” is thus the
public administration it audits. In the Andean countries,
such as Chile and Peru, supreme audit institutions
position themselves as governance institutions,
independent of both the executive and the legislature.
Nevertheless, all supreme audit institutions,
because of their role as fiscal comptroller, are
particularly exposed to political meddling and prone
to capture by partisan interests, especially in presidential
systems of government. The experience of the Peruvian
Comptroller-General’s Office (Contraloría General de
la República, CGR) between 1993 and 2000 is
illustrative. A first strategy for preventing such capture
is to strengthen the functional links between the
institutions of “horizontal accountability” that are part
of the national system of control (O’Donnell, 1998;
Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, 1999). Considerations
of political economy are thus crucial in explaining the
effectiveness of supreme audit institutions, conceived
as integral parts of the national systems of fiscal control
and anti-corruption.
In particular, the strengthening of the functional
links between supreme audit institutions and the other
institutions in the national system of fiscal control, in
particular the judiciary (administrative and criminal
courts) and the legislature (public accounts committees),
is key. Whether nominally attached to parliaments or
not, supreme audit institutions are functionally linked
to them in the “chain of public finance oversight”. The
case of the support provided by the IDB to Colombia
offers an illustration of this, as it reflects an integrated
effort to simultaneously strengthen government
accountability, public finance integrity, budgetary
oversight and law enforcement. In April 2003, the IDB
approved a US$ 14 million loan (as part of a US$ 20
million programme) to the Office of the Attorney-
General (Procuraduría General de la Nación, PGN), the
judicial office in charge of overseeing and disciplining
public agencies. This programme completes a decade-
long financing cycle to modernize oversight and law
enforcement agencies in public finance management.
In March 2000 a US$ 23 million loan was granted (as
part of a US$ 42 million programme) to the offices of
the Comptroller-General (Contraloría General de la
República, CGR) and Auditor-General (Auditoría General
de la República, AGR), and in December 1995 a US$ 9.5
million loan (part of a US$ 15.7 million programme)
went to modernize the administration of justice and the
Public Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía General de la
Nación, FGN). All three loans had significant counterpart
financing (US$ 77.7 million in total), reflecting the
commitment of Colombia to these programmes.
Supreme audit institutions provide critical
advisory services to parliaments, directly or indirectly,
in the exercise of their accountability functions.
However, relations between supreme audit institutions
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and parliamentary budget and public accounts
committees are deficient, often characterized by polite
indifference. Loans to supreme audit institutions tend
to overlook the dysfunctional linkages between these
bodies and parliaments. While IDB lending to national
parliaments focuses on enhancing their role in budget
policy-making, support to supreme audit institutions
tends to neglect their role in budget oversight and
auditing. Only in a few countries, such as the
Dominican Republic in 2000 and El Salvador in 1999,
has the IDB addressed the relationship between supreme
audit institutions and parliaments. In these two
instances, loans were made simultaneously to both
institutions; in the case of the Dominican Republic,
they were merged into a single loan.
IDB lending operations tend to avoid confronting
the broader governance context in which supreme audit
institutions operate and the incentives conditioning
public finance accountability. They seldom seek to
enhance the political independence and financial
autonomy of these institutions in an active and
purposeful manner. Issues such as the criteria guiding
the nomination and removal of auditors-general and the
length of their term in office, and the procedures
regulating recruitment, promotion and dismissal of
professional staff, are nevertheless critical determinants
of the effective independence of supreme audit
institutions. Credible appointment criteria and stability
of tenure determine the extent to which auditors-
general are likely to behave independently. Predictable
financial resources are also a necessary (albeit not
sufficient) condition for institutionalizing supreme
audit institutions and insulating them from political
meddling (INTOSAI, 2001).
Politicization of the auditor-general’s appointment
procedure and that of the supreme audit institution’s
staff is a major hindrance to the effective independence
of the institution. When the government controls a
majority in parliament, in either parliamentary or
presidential systems, nominations often reflect political
bargains. Furthermore, short terms of office that
coincide with that of the president tend to reduce the
incentives for auditors-general to exercise any political
independence they may have. Ultimately, these
individual incentives motivate the institutional
behaviour of supreme audit institutions. In Argentina,
for example, the constitution and the law on financial
administration stipulate that auditors-general are
appointed for an eight-year renewable term. However,
in an effort to increase the independence of the AGN,
an amendment to the constitution in 1994 established
that the president of the AGN was to be chosen from
the main opposition party. As a result, presidents of the
AGN have changed as government majorities have.
Furthermore, the politicization of the civil service has
entailed high rates of staff turnover and thus has not
allowed the consolidation of technical expertise and an
“esprit de corps” within the supreme audit institution.
A highly capable and respected civil service, with
stability of tenure and reasonable career prospects
within the institution, is crucial for consolidating a
professional approach to the external auditing of
government finances.12
In general, strengthening technical capacity per se
does not necessarily improve the effectiveness of
supreme audit institutions, nor has it prevented them
from being captured, as in the case of Nicaragua. Yet,
securing the effective independence of these institutions
is a critical determinant of their ultimate ability to hold
government accountable, as was underscored by the
1977 Lima declaration of principle of the International
Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI)
and, more recently, the final report of the INTOSAI task
force on independent government auditing (INTOSAI,
2001). It is widely recognized that an inherent
weakness of the State in developing countries resides
in the frailty of the institutional mechanisms of
“horizontal accountability” anchored in those State
institutions whose function is to control government
and restrain the State (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003).
12 Moreover, IDB lending operations have tended to concentrate their
efforts at the national or federal level. The mechanisms for internal
and external auditing of government finances are particularly weak
at the local level, often being captured by local elites. The IDB is
only just starting to support subnational supreme audit institutions
in federal systems and to cooperate with the deconcentration of
such institutions in unitary States.
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IV
The politics of public finance
accountability
A decade after the emergence of governance to the
forefront of the development agenda, new approaches
to governance reform and institutional development are
warranted. These require in particular a narrowing of
the gap between economic and political facets of
multilateral development finance. The assessment of
the IDB approach to the modernization of budget
oversight institutions is particularly instructive in that
regard, as the IDB is the most political of the multilateral
development banks.
The impact of IDB lending to parliaments and
supreme audit institutions is still difficult to decipher.
As Kaufmann (2003, p. 3) notes, “we need to take into
consideration that this effort has taken place against the
backdrop of a relatively undeveloped state of the art
in the complex and multidisciplinary field of
governance and anticorruption”. There are a number
of difficulties in evaluating results. First, it is necessary
to define indicators of impact for this new type of
projects that deliberately set out to strengthen
institutions. A second and even more critical challenge
is to identify indicators that can measure the
performance and ultimate impact of the institutions of
control themselves. A third challenge is to decide how
the politics of public finance accountability can best
be addressed, and to what degree. When all this is
done, the number and variety of explanatory variables
expands considerably. Acknowledging the importance
of the politics of budgeting and the political economy
of public finance accountability is certainly a step
forward.
Nevertheless, IDB lending to national parliaments
and supreme audit institutions displays a reluctance to
confront dysfunctions in the political economy of fiscal
control and the politics of financial accountability. The
bulk of IDB financing to budget oversight institutions
is directed towards hardware investments, such as
infrastructure development, information technology
and human resources management. In a more recent
past, IDB support has also been directed at reforming
the procedures and strengthening the structures framing
the parliamentary budget process, such as budget and
finance committees, legislative research capacities and
legislative budget offices. Only a handful of Latin
American parliaments such as those of Brazil, Chile,
Peru, and Venezuela do possess such independent
research and advisory capabilities. The IDB increasingly
advocates strengthening these where they exist, and
creating them where they do not.
The IFIs justify their apolitical approach by
arguing that technical improvements can, over time,
contribute to improving governance, without being
diluted in the intricacies of politics. Framing
governance as a technical question has indeed allowed
them to justify their involvement in governance issues,
while remaining within the boundaries of their
respective mandates. There are limits to this
technocratic consensus, however. This functionalist
approach gives the illusion that technical solutions can
solve political problems. Institutional reforms in public
budgeting are inherently political (Shepsle, 1999;
Wildavsky, 1964 and 1992). While usually couched in
the language of efficiency, public finance reform
affects power relations, as the budget is a key arena
for political bargaining. Decisions as to who controls
the budget process and how budgetary allocations are
made are intrinsically political. As a consequence,
trying to separate the economic and the political facets
of public budgeting is, to a large extent, artificial. As
Kaufmann (2003, p. 33) underscores, “a proper
understanding of the political forces affecting policy-
making and, related, the set of required institutional
incentives for progress” is necessary to understand the
dynamics of budgetary reform.
The IDB (2003, p. 9) does recognize that “projects
that are limited to changing instrumental elements or
simply strengthen technical organizational capacities,
without altering the structure of incentives that affect
the political will to apply them are likely in general to
have a negligible impact. Thus institutional changes
that condition the effectiveness of instrumental and
organizational reforms need to be addressed at the
same time […] It does little good to establish a
financial management system without the development
of a budgetary authority with the professional
independence, power, and capacity to enforce it.”
Reform efforts fail not only because they are
incomplete, but also because they are often designed
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to solve technical shortcomings when the problem lies
in the institutional framework.
A broader understanding of the governance of the
budget process is thus warranted. Supreme audit
institutions and public accounts committees occupy key
positions in the architecture of public finance
management and fiscal control (Wehner, 2003; Petri
1998). The quality of parliament’s oversight of
government finances depends critically on credible
information and independent budget analysis being
provided by supreme audit institutions in a timely
manner. At the same time, the effectiveness and
ultimate impact of supreme audit institutions largely
depend on the extent to which parliaments act upon the
recommendations of their audit reports. Thus, the
quality of the functional linkage and institutional
relationships between parliamentary public accounts
committees and supreme audit institutions is key
(SIGMA, 2002). Again, the ability of supreme audit
institutions to fulfil their mandate depends on their
effective independence from government and, at the
same time, the cooperation they receive from
government agencies.
Relations between supreme audit institutions and
public accounts committees are decisive for the
enforcement of government accountability. Institutional
arrangements and incentive structures largely explain
the ultimate effectiveness of both. First, the reports and
recommendations of supreme audit institutions are
largely ineffective if they are not acted on by other
institutions that are part of the system of control, in
particular the public administration itself (administrative
accountability), the judiciary (criminal accountability)
and parliament (political accountability). Thus, their
effectiveness is conditional on the cooperation of other
State institutions. Furthermore, in many cases,
especially in presidential systems, the consent of a
qualified majority of members of parliament (often two
thirds), including the ruling party, is required to
nominate auditors-general. The political bargains that
are struck often undermine the political independence
of the chosen candidate.
Second, the willingness of public accounts
committees to exercise their powers and hold
government to account is also determined by broader
governance factors. These committees are a reflection
of legislative politics and the nature of executive-
legislative relations (Morgenstern and Nacif, 2002).
Indeed, their composition reflects that of parliament
itself and, as a result, the ruling party often controls
them. By contrast with parliamentary systems, where
they are presided over by a representative of the
opposition, in Latin America the chairmanship of
budget and public accounts committees traditionally
goes to a member of the ruling party. Indeed, it could
be argued that the effectiveness of the mechanisms of
horizontal accountability within the State ultimately
depends on the effectiveness of the mechanisms of
vertical accountability, in particular electoral rules and
party structures.
The behaviour of members of parliament is itself
shaped by the incentives to which they respond.
Executive-legislative relations are necessarily
intermediated by political party systems and electoral
rules, as there is a possibility of control being diluted
when the ruling party or coalition holds a majority
position in parliament. Recent research on the politics
of budgeting in Brazil13 shows that participation by the
legislative branch in the budget process can only be
understood when the political parties and electoral rules
are taken into account. As the executive dominates the
budget process and controls budget execution, the way
parties participate in this process depends on their
relations with the executive (Pereira and Mueller,
2002). Indeed, in presidential systems marked by the
fusion of executive and legislative majorities, systems
for enforcing government accountability tend to be
inoperative.
There thus exists unexplored potential in the
support provided by multilateral development banks to
Latin America’s supreme audit institutions and public
accounts committees. The second stage of multilateral
support to budget oversight institutions should thus
seek to strengthen the political independence and
financial autonomy of supreme audit institutions, and
promote more effective links between these and
parliamentary public accounts committees. Analysis of
IDB loans often reveals that such linkages are absent
from the design of these interventions. In general, IDB
lending operations tend to be designed as self-
contained interventions, which has the advantage of
protecting them from unwarranted external
interference, but which also has the disadvantage of
inhibiting synergies between them.
Furthermore, the IFIs should also endeavour to
design integrated initiatives addressing the entire
budgetary cycle and the governance of the budget
process as a whole. This would require linking efforts
13 See Mainwaring and Welna (2003), Morgenstern and Manzetti
(2003) and Figueiredo (2001 and 2003).
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to coordinate projects intended to modernize public
financial management information systems within the
executive with those aimed at enhancing the contribution
of external audit agencies and legislative committees.
This would also mean integrating efforts to improve
public finance management and accountability more
tidily with those aimed at consolidating the rule of law,
reforming civil services, strengthening legislatures and
combating corruption.
More fundamentally, multilateral lending
operations aimed at strengthening budget oversight
institutions need to factor in and engage with structural
power dynamics. As Messick (2002, p. 1) underscores,
“success requires changing the incentives facing public
officials […] Constitutional structure and party
cohesion are key determinants of a legislature’s
independence.” Increasing technical capacity and
enhancing analytical capabilities by building up
14 See IDB (2003).
legislative research services or improving investigation
techniques in audit institutions are likely to remain
ineffectual as long as there is not enough political space
for them to be exercised effectively. Technical
improvements are likely to be emasculated by adverse
political dynamics and governance constraints. The key
question is whether endowing oversight institutions
with more technical capacity can strengthen them, or
whether increased independence and assertiveness
would lead these institutions to create and utilize more
technical capacity. The IDB tends to rely on the first
approach, focusing on building up the technical
capacity of oversight institutions. However, there are
reasons to believe that the latter might be an
efficacious complementary strategy, and it is now
within the purview of the new IDB strategy for
reforming the State and modernizing government
adopted in 2003.14
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